The Nature of Risk Preferences: Evidence from Insurance Choices

By Levon Barseghyan, Francesca Molinari, Ted O'Donoghue, and Joshua C. Teitelbaum

We use data on insurance deductible choices to estimate a structural model of risky choice that incorporates “standard” risk aversion (diminishing marginal utility for wealth) and probability distortions. We find that probability distortions—characterized by substantial overweighting of small probabilities and only mild insensitivity to probability changes—play an important role in explaining the aversion to risk manifested in deductible choices. This finding is robust to allowing for observed and unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. We demonstrate that neither Kőszegi-Rabin loss aversion alone nor Gul disappointment aversion alone can explain our estimated probability distortions, signifying a key role for probability weighting. (JEL D14, D81, G22)

Households are averse to risk—they require a premium to invest in equity and they purchase insurance at actuarially unfair rates. The standard expected utility model attributes risk aversion to a concave utility function defined over final wealth states (diminishing marginal utility for wealth). Indeed, many empirical studies of risk preferences assume expected utility and estimate such “standard” risk aversion (e.g., Cohen and Einav 2007).

A considerable body of research, however, suggests that in addition to (or perhaps instead of) standard risk aversion, households’ aversion to risk may be attributable to other, “nonstandard” features of risk preferences. A large strand of the literature...

In this article, we use data on households’ deductible choices in auto and home insurance to estimate a structural model of risky choice that incorporates standard risk aversion and these nonstandard features, and we investigate which combinations of features best explain our data. We show that, in our domain, probability weighting, KR loss aversion, and Gul disappointment aversion all imply an effective distortion of probabilities relative to the expected utility model. Hence, we focus on estimating a model that features standard risk aversion and “generic” probability distortions. We then investigate what we can learn from our estimates about the possible sources of probability distortions. We find that probability distortions—in the form of substantial overweighting of claim probabilities—play a key role in explaining households’ deductible choices. We then demonstrate that neither KR loss aversion alone nor Gul disappointment aversion alone can explain our estimated probability distortions, signifying a crucial role for probability weighting.

In Section I, we provide an overview of our data. The source of the data is a large US property and casualty insurance company that offers multiple lines of insurance, including auto and home coverage. The full dataset comprises yearly information on more than 400,000 households who held auto or home policies between 1998 and 2006. For reasons we explain, we restrict attention in our main analysis to a core sample of 4,170 households who hold both auto and home policies and who first purchased their auto and home policies from the company in the same year, in either 2005 or 2006. For each household, we observe the household’s deductible choices in three lines of coverage—auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home all perils. We also observe the coverage-specific menus of premium-deductible combinations from which each household’s choices were made. In addition, we observe each household’s claims history for each coverage, as well as a rich set of demographic information. We utilize the data on claim realizations and demographics to assign each household a predicted claim probability for each coverage.

In Section II, we develop our theoretical framework. We begin with an expected utility model of deductible choice, which incorporates standard risk aversion. We then generalize the model to allow for probability distortions—specifically, we permit a household with claim probability \( \mu \) to act as if its claim probability were \( \Omega(\mu) \). In our baseline analysis, we take a semi-nonparametric approach and do not impose a parametric form on the probability distortion function \( \Omega(\mu) \). For the utility for wealth function, we use a second-order Taylor expansion, which allows us to measure standard risk aversion by the coefficient of absolute risk aversion \( r \). Finally, to account for observationally equivalent households choosing different deductibles, and for individual households making “inconsistent” choices across coverages (Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum 2011; Einav et al. 2012), we assume random utility with additively separable choice noise (McFadden 1974, 1981).

In Section IIC, we demonstrate that a key feature of our data—namely, that the choice set for each coverage includes more than two deductible options—enables us
to separately identify standard risk aversion $r$ and the probability distortion $\Omega(\mu)$. To illustrate the basic intuition, consider a household with claim probability $\mu$ and suppose we observe the household’s maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to reduce its deductible from $1,000 to $500. If that were all we observed, we could not separately identify $r$ and $\Omega(\mu)$, because multiple combinations can explain this WTP. However, because standard risk aversion and probability distortions generate aversion to risk in different ways, each of these combinations implies a different WTP to further reduce the deductible from $500 to $250. Therefore, if we also observe this WTP, we can pin down $r$ and $\Omega(\mu)$.

In Section III, we report the results of our baseline analysis in which we assume homogeneous preferences—i.e., we assume that each household has the same standard risk aversion $r$ and the same probability distortion function $\Omega(\mu)$. We take three approaches based on the method of sieves (Chen 2007) to estimating $\Omega(\mu)$, each of which yields the same main message: large probability distortions, characterized by substantial overweighting of claim probabilities and only mild insensitivity to probability changes, in the range of our data. Under our primary approach, for example, our estimates imply $\Omega(0.02) = 0.08$, $\Omega(0.05) = 0.11$, and $\Omega(0.10) = 0.16$. In Section IIIB, we demonstrate the statistical and economic significance of our estimated $\Omega(\mu)$.

In Section IIIC, we discuss what we learn from our baseline estimates about the possible sources of probability distortions. We briefly describe models of probability weighting, KR loss aversion, and Gul disappointment aversion, and derive the probability distortion function implied by each model.\footnote{1 Detailed descriptions of these models appear in the online Appendix.} We demonstrate that models of KR loss aversion and Gul disappointment aversion imply probability distortions that are inconsistent with our estimated $\Omega(\mu)$. We therefore conclude that we can “reject” the hypothesis that KR loss aversion alone or Gul disappointment aversion alone is the source of our estimated probability distortions, and that instead our results point to probability weighting. In addition, we highlight that our estimated $\Omega(\mu)$ bears a close resemblance to the probability weighting function originally posited by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).

In Section IV, we expand the model to permit heterogeneous preferences—i.e., we allow each household to have a different combination of standard risk aversion and probability distortions. We take three approaches, permitting first only observed heterogeneity, then only unobserved heterogeneity, and then both observed and unobserved heterogeneity.\footnote{2 A number of recent papers have studied the role of unobserved heterogeneity in risk preferences (e.g., Cohen and Einav 2007; Chiappori et al. 2009; Andrikogiannopoulou 2011).} We find that our main message is robust to allowing for heterogeneity in preferences. While our estimates indicate substantial heterogeneity, under each approach the average probability distortion function is remarkably similar to our baseline estimated $\Omega(\mu)$.

In Section V, we investigate the sensitivity of our estimates to other modeling assumptions. Most notably, we extend the model to account for unobserved heterogeneity in claim probabilities, we consider the case of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility, and we address the issue of moral hazard. All in all, we find that our main message is quite robust.
We conclude in Section VI by discussing certain implications and limitations of our study. Among other things, we discuss the relevance of the fact that, in our data, probability weighting is indistinguishable from systematic risk misperceptions. Hence, the probability distortions we estimate may reflect either probability weighting or risk misperceptions.

Numerous previous studies estimate risk preferences from observed choices, relying in most cases on survey and experimental data and in some cases on economic field data. Most studies that rely on field data—including two that use data on insurance deductible choices (Cohen and Einav 2007; Sydnor 2010)—estimate expected utility models, which permit only standard risk aversion. Only a handful of studies use field data to estimate models that feature probability weighting. Cicchetti and Dubin (1994), who use data on telephone wire insurance choices to estimate a rank-dependent expected utility model, and Jullien and Salanié (2000), who use data on bets on UK horse races to estimate a rank-dependent expected utility model and a prospect theory model, find little evidence of probability weighting. Kliger and Levy (2009) use data on call options on the S&P 500 index to estimate a prospect theory model and find that probability weighting is manifested by their data. Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) use data on bets on US horse races to test the fit of two models—a model with standard risk aversion alone and a model with probability weighting alone—and find that the latter model better fits their data. Andrikogiannopoulou (2011) uses data on bets in an online sportsbook to estimate a prospect theory model and finds that the average bettor exhibits moderate probability weighting. Lastly, Chiappori et al. (2012) and Gandhi and Serrano-Padial (2012) use data on bets on US horse races to estimate the distribution of risk preferences among bettors and find evidence consistent with probability weighting.

Each of the foregoing studies, however, either (i) uses market-level data, which necessitates taking a representative agent approach (Jullien and Salanié 2000; Kliger and Levy 2009; Snowberg and Wolfers 2010) or assuming that different populations of agents have the same distribution of risk preferences (Chiappori et al. 2012; Gandhi and Serrano-Padial 2012), (ii) estimates a model that does not simultaneously feature standard risk aversion and probability weighting (Klier and Levy 2009; Snowberg and Wolfers 2010; Andrikogiannopoulou 2011), or (iii) takes a parametric approach to probability weighting, specifying one of the common functions from the literature (Cicchetti and Dubin 1994; Jullien and Salanié 2000; Kliger and Levy 2009; Andrikogiannopoulou 2011). An important contribution of our study is that we use household-level field data on insurance choices to jointly estimate standard risk aversion and nonstandard probability distortions without imposing a...
parametric form on the latter. 5 Our approach in this regard yields two important results. First, by imposing no parametric form on Ω(μ), we estimate a function that is inconsistent with the probability weighting functions that are commonly used in the literature (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Lattimore, Baker, and Witte 1992; Prelec 1998). Second, by jointly estimating r and Ω(μ), we can empirically assess their relative impact on choices, and we find that probability distortions generally have a larger economic impact than standard risk aversion.

I. Data Description

A. Overview and Core Sample

We acquired the data from a large US property and casualty insurance company. The company offers multiple lines of insurance, including auto, home, and umbrella policies. The full dataset comprises yearly information on more than 400,000 households who held auto or home policies between 1998 and 2006. 6 For each household, the data contain all the information in the company’s records regarding the households and their policies (except for identifying information). The data also record the number of claims that each household filed with the company under each of its policies during the period of observation.

We restrict attention to households’ deductible choices in three lines of coverage: (i) auto collision coverage; (ii) auto comprehensive coverage; and (iii) home all perils coverage. 7 In addition, we consider only the initial deductible choices of each household. This is meant to increase confidence that we are working with active choices; one might be concerned that some households renew their policies without actively reassessing their deductible choices. Finally, we restrict attention to households who hold both auto and home policies and who first purchased their auto and home policies from the company in the same year, in either 2005 or 2006. The latter restriction is meant to avoid temporal issues, such as changes in household characteristics and in the economic environment. In the end, we are left with a core sample of 4,170 households. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for a subset of variables, specifically those we use later to estimate the households’ utility parameters.

B. Deductibles and Premiums

For each household in the core sample, we observe the household’s deductible choices for auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home, as well as the premiums paid by the household for each type of coverage. In addition, the data contain the exact menus of premium-deductible combinations that were available to each household.

5 This is the case for our baseline analysis in Section III. In our analysis in Sections IV and V, we take a parametric approach that is guided by the results of our baseline analysis.

6 The dataset used in this article is not the same dataset used in Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum (2011). This dataset includes households that purchase insurance from a single insurance company (through multiple insurance agents), whereas that dataset includes households that purchase insurance through a single insurance agent (from multiple insurance companies).

7 A brief description of each type of coverage appears in the online Appendix. For simplicity, we often refer to home all perils merely as home.
at the time it made its deductible choices. Tables 2 and 3 summarize the deductible choices and the premium menus, respectively, of the households in the core sample.8

Because it is important to understand the sources of variation in premiums, we briefly describe the plan the company uses to rate a policy in each line of coverage. We emphasize that the company’s rating plan is subject to state regulation and oversight. In particular, the regulations require that the company receive prior

8 Tables A.1 through A.3 in the online Appendix summarize the premium menus conditional on households’ actual deductible choices.
approval of its rating plan by the state insurance commissioner, and they prohibit the company and its agents from charging rates that depart from the plan. Under the plan, the company determines a base price $\bar{p}$ for each household according to a coverage-specific rating function, which takes into account the household’s coverage-relevant characteristics and any applicable discounts. Using the base price, the company then generates a household-specific menu $\{(p_d, d): d \in \mathcal{D}\}$, which associates a premium $p_d$ with each deductible $d$ in the coverage-specific set of deductible options $\mathcal{D}$, according to a coverage-specific multiplication rule, $p_d = (g(d) \cdot \bar{p}) + c$, where $g(\cdot) > 0$ and $c > 0$. The multiplicative factors $\{g(d): d \in \mathcal{D}\}$ are known in the industry as the deductible factors, and $c$ is a small markup known as the expense fee. The deductible factors and the expense fee are coverage specific but household invariant.

C. Claim Probabilities

For purposes of our analysis, we need to estimate for each household the likelihood of experiencing a claim for each coverage. We begin by estimating how claim rates depend on observables. In an effort to obtain the most precise estimates, we use the full dataset: 1,348,020 household-year records for auto and 1,265,229 household-year records for home. For each household-year record, the data record the number of claims filed by the household in that year. We assume that household $i$’s claims under coverage $j$ in year $t$ follow a Poisson distribution with arrival rate $\lambda_{ijt}$. In addition, we assume that deductible choices do not influence claim rates, i.e., households do not suffer from moral hazard.\footnote{We revisit this assumption in Section VD.} We treat the claim rates as latent random variables and assume that

$$\ln \lambda_{ijt} = X_{ijt}' \beta_j + \epsilon_{ij},$$

where $X_{ijt}$ is a vector of observables, $\epsilon_{ij}$ is an unobserved i.i.d. error term, and $\exp(\epsilon_{ij})$ follows a gamma distribution with unit mean and variance $\phi_j$. We perform standard Poisson panel regressions with random effects to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of $\beta_j$ and $\phi_j$ for each coverage $j$. By allowing for unobserved heterogeneity, the Poisson random effects model accounts for overdispersion, including due to excess zeros, in a similar way as the (pooled) negative binomial model (see, e.g., Wooldridge 2002, chapter 19).\footnote{An alternative approach would be a zero-inflated model. However, Vuong (1989) and likelihood ratio tests select the negative binomial model over the zero-inflated model, suggesting that adjustment for excess zeros is not necessary once we allow for unobserved heterogeneity.} The results of the claim rate regressions are reported in Tables A.4 and A.5 in the online Appendix.

Next, we use the results of the claim rate regressions to generate predicted claim probabilities. Specifically, for each household $i$, we use the regression estimates to generate a predicted claim rate $\hat{\lambda}_{ij}$ for each coverage $j$, conditional on the household’s ex ante characteristics $X_{ij}$ and ex post claims experience.\footnote{More specifically, $\hat{\lambda}_{ij} = \exp(X_{ij}' \hat{\beta}_j)E(\exp(\epsilon_{ij})|Y_{ij})$, where $Y_{ij}$ records household $i$’s claims experience under coverage $j$ after purchasing the policy and $E(\exp(\epsilon_{ij})|Y_{ij})$ is calculated assuming $\exp(\epsilon_{ij})$ follows a gamma distribution with unit mean and variance $\phi_j$.} In principle, during the policy period, a household may experience zero claims, one claim, two claims, and
so forth. In the model, we assume that households disregard the possibility of more than one claim (see Section IIA).\(^{13}\) Given this assumption, we transform \(\hat{\lambda}_{ij}\) into a predicted claim probability \(\hat{\mu}_{ij}\) using\(^{14}\)

\[
\hat{\mu}_{ij} = 1 - \exp(-\hat{\lambda}_{ij}).
\]

\(^{13}\)Because claim rates are small (85 percent of the predicted claim rates in the core sample are less than 0.1, and 99 percent are less than 0.2), the likelihood of two or more claims is very small.

\(^{14}\)The Poisson probability mass function is \(f(x, \lambda) = \exp(-\lambda)\lambda^x/x!\) for \(x = 0, 1, 2, \ldots\) and \(\lambda \geq 0\). Thus, if the number of claims \(x\) follows a Poisson distribution with arrival rate \(\lambda\), then the probability of experiencing at least one claim is \(1 - \exp(-\lambda)\).
Table 4 summarizes the predicted claim probabilities for the core sample. Figure 1 plots the empirical density functions. The mean predicted claim probabilities for auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home are 0.069, 0.021, and 0.084, respectively. Auto comprehensive accounts for most of the low claim probabilities, while auto collision and home account for the bulk of the medium and high claim probabilities. Table 4 also reports pairwise correlations among the predicted claim probabilities and between the predicted claim probabilities and the premiums for coverage with a $500 deductible. Each of the pairwise correlations is positive, though none is large. These small correlations are not surprising. Even for a fixed claim probability, there are a variety of reasons why the company would want to charge different premiums to different households—e.g., differences in the insured value of the auto or home, differences in the relevant repair and rebuilding costs, and volume discounts. Moreover, our predicted claim probabilities take into account ex post claims experience (i.e., claims that occur after the household purchases the policy), and this information is not available to the company when it rates the policy.

II. Model, Estimation, and Identification

A. Model

We assume that a household treats its three deductible choices as independent decisions. This assumption is motivated in part by computational considerations but also by the literature on “narrow bracketing” (e.g., Read, Loewenstein, and Rabin 1999), which suggests that when people make multiple choices, they frequently do not assess the consequences in an integrated way but rather tend to make each choice in isolation. Thus, we develop a model for how a household chooses the deductible for a single type of insurance coverage. To simplify notation, we suppress the subscripts for household and coverage (although we remind the reader that premiums and claim probabilities are household and coverage specific).

The household faces a menu of premium-deductible pairs \( \{(p_d, d) : d \in D\} \), where \( p_d \) is the premium associated with deductible \( d \), and \( D \) is the set of deductible options. We assume that the household disregards the possibility of experiencing more than one claim during the policy period, and that the probability of experiencing one claim is \( \mu \). In addition, we assume that the household believes that its choice of deductible does not influence its claim probability, and that every claim exceeds the highest available deductible. Under the foregoing assumptions, the choice of deductible involves a choice among deductible lotteries of the form

\[
L_d \equiv (-p_d, 1 - \mu; -p_d - d, \mu).
\]

15 If instead we were to assume that a household treats its deductible choices as a joint decision, then the household would face 120 options, and the utility function would have several hundred terms.

16 We make the latter assumption more plausible by excluding the $2,500 and $5,000 deductible options from the home menu. Only 1.6 percent of households in the core sample chose a home deductible of $2,500 or $5,000. We assign these households a home deductible of $1,000. In this respect, we follow Cohen and Einav (2007), who also exclude the two highest deductible options (chosen by 1 percent of the policyholders in their sample) and assign the third highest deductible to policyholders who chose the two highest options.
Under expected utility theory, a household’s preferences over deductible lotteries are influenced only by standard risk aversion. Given initial wealth $w$, the expected utility of deductible lottery $L_d$ is given by

$$EU(L_d) = (1 - \mu)u(w - p_d) + \mu u(w - p_d - d),$$

where $u(w)$ represents standard utility defined over final wealth states. Standard risk aversion is captured by the concavity of $u(w)$.

Over the years, economists and other social scientists have proposed alternative models that feature additional sources of aversion to risk. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) offer prospect theory, which features probability weighting and loss aversion. Gul (1991) proposes a model of disappointment aversion. More recently, Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) develop a model of reference-dependent utility that features loss aversion with an endogenous reference point, which we label KR loss aversion. In the online Appendix, we show that, in our setting, probability weighting, KR loss aversion, and Gul disappointment aversion all imply an effective distortion of probabilities relative to the expected utility model. Specifically, each implies that there exists a probability distortion function $\Omega(\mu)$ such that the utility of deductible lottery $L_d$ may be written as

$$U(L_d) = (1 - \Omega(\mu))u(w - p_d) + \Omega(\mu) u(w - p_d - d).$$

In the estimation, we do not take a stand on the underlying source of probability distortions. Their separate identification would require parametric assumptions which we are unwilling to make. Rather, we focus on estimating “generic” probability distortions—i.e., we estimate the function $\Omega(\mu)$. We then discuss what we learn from our estimated $\Omega(\mu)$ about the possible sources of probability distortions (see Section IIIC).

In our analysis, we estimate both the utility function $u(w)$ and the probability distortion function $\Omega(\mu)$. For $u(w)$, we generally follow Cohen and Einav (2007) and Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum (2011) and consider a second-order Taylor expansion. Also, because $u(w)$ is unique only up to an affine transformation, we normalize the scale of utility by dividing $u'(w)$. This yields

$$\frac{u(w + \Delta)}{u'(w)} - \frac{u(w)}{u'(w)} = \Delta - \frac{r}{2} \Delta^2,$$

where $r \equiv -u''(w)/u'(w)$ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Because the term $u(w)/u'(w)$ enters as an additive constant, it does not affect utility comparisons; hence, we drop it. With this specification, equation (1) becomes

---

17 We do not consider the original, “status quo” loss aversion proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) because it cannot explain aversion to risk in the context of insurance deductible choices, where all outcomes are losses relative to initial wealth. Instead, we consider KR loss aversion, which can explain aversion to risk in this context, because gains and losses are defined relative to expectations about outcomes. For details, see Section IIIC and the online Appendix.
The first term reflects the expected value of deductible lottery \( L_d \) with respect to the distorted claim probability \( \Omega(\mu) \). The second term reflects disutility from bearing risk—it is the expected value of the squared losses, scaled by standard risk aversion \( r \).

Our goal is to estimate both standard risk aversion \( r \) and the probability distortion \( \Omega(\mu) \). In our baseline analysis in Section III, we take a semi-nonparametric approach and estimate \( \Omega(\mu) \) via sieve methods (Chen 2007). In Sections IV and V, we take a parametric approach that is guided by the results of our baseline analysis.

B. Estimation

In the estimation, we must account for observationally equivalent households choosing different deductibles, and for individual households making “inconsistent” choices across coverages (Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum 2011; Einav et al. 2012). We follow McFadden (1974, 1981) and assume random utility with additively separable choice noise. Specifically, we assume that the utility from deductible \( d \in D \) is given by

\[
U(d) = U(L_d) + \varepsilon_d,
\]

where \( \varepsilon_d \) is an i.i.d. random variable that represents error in evaluating utility. We assume that \( \varepsilon_d \) follows a type 1 extreme value distribution with scale parameter \( \sigma \).

A household chooses deductible \( d \) when \( U(d) > U(d') \) for all \( d' \neq d \), and thus the probability that a household chooses deductible \( d \) is

\[
Pr(d) = \frac{\exp(U(L_d)/\sigma)}{\sum_{d' \in D} \exp(U(L_{d'})/\sigma)}.
\]

We use these choice probabilities to construct the likelihood function in the estimation.

In our main analysis, we estimate equation (3) assuming that utility is specified by equation (2) and that \( \mu_{ij} = \hat{\mu}_{ij} \) (i.e., household \( i \)'s predicted claim probability \( \hat{\mu}_{ij} \) corresponds to its subjective claim probability \( \mu_{ij} \)). We use combined data for all three coverages. Each observation comprises, for a household \( i \) and a coverage \( j \), a deductible choice \( d_{ij}^{\ast} \), a vector of household characteristics \( Z_i \), a predicted claim probability \( \hat{\mu}_{ij} \), and a menu of premium-deductible combinations \( \{(p_{d_{ij}}, d_{ij}) : d_{ij} \in D_j\} \).

To be estimated are:

\[
\begin{align*}
    r_i & \quad \text{coefficient of absolute risk aversion; } \\
    \Omega(\mu) & \quad \text{probability distortion function; and } \\
    \sigma_j & \quad \text{scale of choice noise for coverage } j.
\end{align*}
\]

Note that this specification differs slightly from Cohen and Einav (2007) and Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum (2011), who use \( U(L_d) = -[p_d + \lambda d] - (r/2)[\lambda d^2] \) (where \( \lambda \) is the Poisson arrival rate). The difference derives from the fact that those papers additionally take the limit as the policy period becomes arbitrarily small.

The scale parameter \( \sigma \) is a monotone transformation of the variance of \( \varepsilon_d \), and thus a larger \( \sigma \) means larger variance. Our estimation procedure permits \( \sigma \) to vary across coverages.
Note that because the scale of utility is pinned down in equation (2), we can identify \( \sigma_L, \sigma_M, \) and \( \sigma_H \) separately for auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home, respectively.

C. Identification

Identifying \( r \) and \( \Omega(\mu) \).—The random utility model in equation (3) comprises the sum of a utility function \( U(L_d) \) and an error term \( \varepsilon_d \). Using the results of Matzkin (1991), normalizations that fix scale and location, plus regularity conditions that are satisfied in our model allows us to identify nonparametrically the utility function \( U(L_d) \) within the class of monotone and concave utility functions. As we explain below, identification of \( U(L_d) \) allows us to identify \( r \) and \( \Omega(\mu) \).

Take any three deductible options \( a, b, c \in D, \) with \( a > b > c \), and consider a household with premium \( p_a \) for deductible \( a \) and claim probability \( \mu \). The household’s \( r \) and \( \Omega(\mu) \) determine the premium \( \tilde{p}_b \) that makes the household indifferent between deductibles \( a \) and \( b \), as well as the premium \( \tilde{p}_c \) that makes the household indifferent between deductibles \( a \) and \( c \). Notice that \( \tilde{p}_b - p_a \) reflects the household’s maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to reduce its deductible from \( a \) to \( b \), and \( \tilde{p}_c - \tilde{p}_b \) reflects the household’s additional WTP to reduce its deductible from \( b \) to \( c \). In the online Appendix, we prove the following properties of \( \tilde{p}_b \) and \( \tilde{p}_c \) when \( U(L_d) \) is specified by equation (2).

**Proposition 1:** Both \( \tilde{p}_b \) and \( \tilde{p}_c \) are strictly increasing in \( r \) and \( \Omega(\mu) \).

**Proposition 2:** For any fixed \( \Omega(\mu) \), \( r = 0 \) implies \( \frac{\tilde{p}_b - p_a}{\tilde{p}_c - \tilde{p}_b} = \frac{a - b}{b - c} \), and the ratio \( \frac{\tilde{p}_b - p_a}{\tilde{p}_c - \tilde{p}_b} \) is strictly increasing in \( r \).

**Proposition 3:** If \( \tilde{p}_b - p_a \) is the same for \( (r, \Omega(\mu)) \) and \( (r', \Omega(\mu))' \) with \( r < r' \) (and thus \( \Omega(\mu) > \Omega(\mu)' \)), then \( \tilde{p}_c - \tilde{p}_b \) is greater for \( (r, \Omega(\mu)) \) than for \( (r', \Omega(\mu))' \).

Proposition 1 is straightforward: A household’s WTP to reduce its deductible (and thereby reduce its exposure to risk) will be greater if either its standard risk aversion is larger or its (distorted) claim probability is larger.

Proposition 2 is an implication of standard risk aversion. For any fixed \( \Omega(\mu) \), a risk neutral household is willing to pay, for instance, exactly twice as much to reduce its deductible from $1,000 to $500 as it is willing to pay to reduce its deductible from $500 to $250. In contrast, a risk-averse household is willing to pay more than twice as much, and the larger is the household’s standard risk aversion the greater is this ratio.

Proposition 3 is the key property for identification. To illustrate the underlying intuition, consider a household with claim probability \( \mu = 0.05 \) which faces a premium \( p_a = $200 \) for deductible \( a = $1,000 \). Suppose that \( \tilde{p}_b - p_a = $50 \)—i.e., the household’s WTP to reduce its deductible from \( a = $1,000 \) to \( b = $500 \) is $50. Proposition 1 implies that multiple combinations of \( r \) and \( \Omega(0.05) \) are consistent with this WTP, and that in each combination a larger \( r \) implies a smaller \( \Omega(0.05) \).

For example, both (i) \( r = 0 \) and \( \Omega(0.05) = 0.10 \) and (ii) \( r' = 0.00222 \) and \( \Omega(0.05)' = 0.05 \) are consistent with \( \tilde{p}_b - p_a = $50 \). Proposition 3, however, states that these
different combinations of \( r \) and \( \Omega(0.05) \) have different implications for the household’s WTP to reduce its deductible from \( b = $500 \) to \( c = $250 \). For instance, \( r = 0 \) and \( \Omega(0.05) = 0.10 \) would imply \( \tilde{p}_c - \tilde{p}_b = $25 \), whereas \( r' = 0.00222 \) and \( \Omega(0.05)' = 0.05 \) would imply \( \tilde{p}_c - \tilde{p}_b = $18.61 \). More generally—given the household’s WTP to reduce its deductible from $1,000 to $500—the smaller is the household’s WTP to reduce it deductible from $500 to $250, the larger must be its \( r \) and the smaller must be its \( \Omega(0.05) \).20

Proposition 3 reveals that our identification strategy relies on a key feature of our data—namely, that there are more than two deductible options. Given this feature, we can separately identify \( r \) and \( \Omega(\mu) \) by observing how deductible choices react to exogenous changes in premiums for a fixed claim probability.21 We then can identify the shape of \( \Omega(\mu) \) by observing how deductible choices react to exogenous changes in claim probabilities. In other words, given three or more deductible options, it is exogenous variation in premiums for a fixed \( \mu \) that allows us to pin down \( r \) and \( \Omega(\mu) \), and it is exogenous variation in claim probabilities that allows us to map out \( \Omega(\mu) \) for all \( \mu \) in the range of our data.

Exogenous Variation in Premiums and Claim Probabilities.—Within each coverage, there is substantial variation in premiums and claim probabilities. A key identifying assumption is that there is variation in premiums and claim probabilities that is exogenous to the households’ risk preferences. In our estimation, we assume that a household’s utility parameters—\( r \) and \( \Omega(\mu) \)—depend on a vector of observables \( Z \) that is a strict subset of the variables that determine premiums and claim probabilities. Many of the variables outside \( Z \) that determine premiums and claim probabilities, such as protection class and territory code,22 are arguably exogenous to the households’ risk preferences. In addition, there are other variables outside \( Z \) that determine premiums but not claim probabilities, including numerous discount programs, which also are arguably exogenous to the households’ risk preferences.

Given our choice of \( Z \), there is substantial variation in premiums and claim probabilities that is not explained by \( Z \). In particular, regressions of premiums and predicted claim probabilities on \( Z \) yield low coefficients of determination \( (R^2) \). In the case of auto collision coverage, for example, regressions of premiums (for coverage with a $500 deductible) on \( Z \) and predicted claim probabilities on \( Z \) yield coefficients of determination of 0.16 and 0.34, respectively.23

In addition to the substantial variation in premiums and claim probabilities within a coverage, there also is substantial variation in premiums and claim probabilities across coverages. A key feature of the data is that for each household we observe deductible choices for three coverages, and (even for a fixed \( Z \)) there is substantial variation in premiums and claim probabilities across the three

20 Proposition 3 reads like a single crossing proposition. This is noteworthy in light of recent work that relies on a single crossing condition to estimate risk preferences (e.g., Chiappori et al. 2012).
21 Note that if the data included only two deductible options, as in Cohen and Einav (2007), we could not separately identify \( r \) and \( \Omega(\mu) \) without making strong functional form assumptions about \( \Omega(\mu) \).
22 Protection class gauges the effectiveness of local fire protection and building codes. Territory codes are based on actuarial risk factors, such as traffic and weather patterns, population demographics, wildlife density, and the cost of goods and services.
23 They are even lower for auto comprehensive and home. In the case of auto comprehensive the coefficients of determination are 0.07 and 0.31, and in the case of home they are 0.04 and 0.15.
coverages. Thus, even if the within-coverage variation in premiums and claim probabilities were insufficient in practice, we still might be able to estimate the model using across-coverage variation.

III. Analysis with Homogeneous Preferences

We begin our analysis by assuming homogeneous preferences—i.e., \( r \) and \( \Omega(\mu) \) are the same for all households. This allows us to take a semi-nonparametric approach to estimating the model without facing a curse of dimensionality. As a point of reference, we note that if we do not allow for probability distortions—i.e., we restrict \( \Omega(\mu) = \mu \)—the estimate for \( r \) is 0.0129 (standard error: 0.0004).

A. Estimates

We take three sieve approaches to estimating \( \Omega(\mu) \). In Model 1a, we estimate a Chebyshev polynomial expansion of \( \ln \Omega(\mu) \), which naturally constrains \( \Omega(\mu) > 0 \). We consider expansions up to the twentieth degree and select a quadratic on the basis of the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). In Model 1b, we estimate a Chebyshev polynomial expansion of \( \Omega(\mu) \), which nests the case \( \Omega(\mu) = \mu \). As before, we consider expansions up to the twentieth degree. Here, the BIC selects a cubic. However, because the BIC for the quadratic and cubic are essentially the same, we report results for the quadratic to facilitate direct comparisons with Model 1a. In Model 1c, we estimate \( \Omega(\mu) \) using an 11-point cubic spline on the interval \((0, 0.20)\), wherein lie 99.4 percent of the predicted claim probabilities in the core sample.

Table 5 reports our results. The estimates for \( \Omega(\mu) \) indicate large probability distortions. To illustrate, Figure 2 depicts the estimated \( \Omega(\mu) \) for Models 1a, 1b, and 1c, along with the 95 percent pointwise bootstrap confidence bands for Model 1c. In each model, there is substantial overweighting of claim probabilities. In Model 1a, for example, \( \hat{\Omega}(0.020) = 0.083, \hat{\Omega}(0.050) = 0.111, \hat{\Omega}(0.075) = 0.135, \) and \( \hat{\Omega}(0.100) = 0.156 \). In addition, there is only mild insensitivity to probability changes. For instance, in Model 1a, \( \hat{\Omega}(0.050) - \hat{\Omega}(0.020) \) / \( 0.050 - 0.020 \) = 0.933, \( \hat{\Omega}(0.075) - \hat{\Omega}(0.050) \) / \( 0.075 - 0.050 \) = 0.960, and \( \hat{\Omega}(0.100) - \hat{\Omega}(0.075) \) / \( 0.100 - 0.075 \) = 0.840. Moreover, all three models imply nearly identical distortions of claim probabilities between zero and 14 percent (wherein lie 96.7 percent of the predicted claim probabilities in the core sample), and even for claim probabilities greater than 14 percent the three models are statistically indistinguishable (Models 1a and 1b lie within the 95 percent confidence bands for Model 1c). Given this overweighting, the estimates for \( r \) are smaller than without probability distortions. Specifically, \( \hat{r} \) is 0.00064, 0.00063, and 0.00049 in Models 1a, 1b, and 1c, respectively. Lastly, we note the estimates for the scale of choice noise: \( \hat{\sigma}_L = 26.3, \hat{\sigma}_M = 17.5, \) and \( \hat{\sigma}_H = 68.5 \).

---

24 Here we impose the restriction that \( \Omega(\mu) > 0 \).

25 Figure 2 shows the estimated \( \Omega(\mu) \) on the interval \((0, 0.16)\), wherein lie 98.2 percent of the predicted claim probabilities in the core sample.
To assess the relative statistical importance of probability distortions and standard risk aversion, we estimate restricted models and perform Vuong (1989) model selection tests.\footnote{Vuong’s (1989) test allows one to select between two nonnested models on the basis of which best fits the data. Neither model is assumed to be correctly specified. Vuong (1989) shows that testing whether one model is significantly closer to the truth (its loglikelihood value is significantly greater) than another model amounts to testing the hypothesis that the loglikelihoods have the same expected value.} We find that a model with probability distortions alone is “better” at the 1 percent level than a model with standard risk aversion alone. However, a

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Model 1}
\begin{tabular}{lccc}
\hline
 & Model 1a: ln $\Omega(\mu)$ & Model 1b: $\Omega(\mu)$ & Model 1c: cubic spline \\
\hline
 & Estimate & Standard error & Estimate & Standard error & Estimate & 95 percent bootstrap confidence interval \\
\hline
$r$ & 0.00064*** & 0.00010 & 0.00063*** & 0.00004 & 0.00049 & 0.0000 & 0.0009 \\
$\Omega(\mu)$: constant & $-2.71^{***}$ & 0.03 & $0.061^{***}$ & 0.002 & & & \\
$\Omega(\mu)$: linear & $12.03^{***}$ & 0.30 & $1.186^{***}$ & 0.078 & & & \\
$\Omega(\mu)$: quadratic & $-35.15^{***}$ & 2.17 & $-2.634^{***}$ & 0.498 & & & \\
$\sigma_L$ & $26.31^{***}$ & 1.14 & $26.32^{***}$ & 0.44 & 30.00 & 25.18 & 32.84 \\
$\sigma_M$ & $17.50^{***}$ & 0.50 & $17.49^{***}$ & 0.69 & 25.20 & 20.88 & 27.80 \\
$\sigma_H$ & $68.53^{***}$ & 5.76 & $66.89^{***}$ & 2.11 & 169.40 & 112.39 & 217.38 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Notes: In Model 1a, we estimate a quadratic Chebyshev polynomial expansion of ln $\Omega(\mu)$. In Model 1b, we estimate a quadratic Chebyshev polynomial expansion of $\Omega(\mu)$. In Model 1c, we estimate $\Omega(\mu)$ using an 11-point cubic spline on the interval $(0, 0.20)$. Core sample of 4,170 households.

***Significant at the 1 percent level.
likelihood ratio test rejects at the 1 percent level both (i) the hypothesis of standard risk neutrality \((r = 0)\) for Models 1a and 1b and (ii) the hypothesis of no probability distortions \((\Omega(\mu) = \mu)\) for Model 1b.\(^{27}\) This suggests that probability distortions and standard risk aversion both play a statistically significant role.

To give a sense of the economic significance of our estimates for \(r\) and \(\Omega(\mu)\), we consider the implications for a household’s maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for lower deductibles. Specifically, we consider a household’s WTP to reduce its deductible from $1,000 to $500 when the premium for coverage with a $1,000 deductible is $200. Table 6 displays WTP for selected claim probabilities \(\mu\) and several preference combinations. Column 1 displays WTP for a risk neutral household. Columns 2 through 4 display WTP for preference combinations using the estimates for \(r\) and \(\Omega(\mu)\) from Model 1a. Lastly, column 5 displays WTP for a household with our estimated degree of standard risk aversion when we do not allow for probability distortions. Comparing columns 2 through 4 reveals that our estimated probability distortions have a larger economic impact than our estimated standard risk aversion, except at claim probabilities at the high end of our data, where the impacts are comparably large. Comparing columns 4 and 5 reveals that the best fit of a model which features only standard risk aversion is overly sensitive to changes in claim probability.

Lastly, to give a sense of the economic significance of our estimates for the scale of choice noise \(\sigma_L, \sigma_M, \text{ and } \sigma_H\), we consider the potential for such noise to affect households’ deductible choices. In particular, we use Model 1a to simulate—both with and without choice noise—the deductible choices of the households in the core sample. Over 1,000 iterations, we find that the households’ “noisy” choices match their “noiseless” choices about half the time: 56 percent in auto collision, 43 percent in auto comprehensive, and 50 percent in home. Moreover, we find that households’ “noisy” choices are within one rank (i.e., one step up or down on the menu of deductible options) of their “noiseless” choices more than four-fifths of the time: 94 percent in collision, 82 percent in auto comprehensive, and 95 percent

\(^{27}\) We do not perform a likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis of no probability distortions for Model 1a because it does not nest the case \(\Omega(\mu) = \mu\).
in home. This suggests that choice noise, at the scale we estimate, is important but not dominant.\(^{28}\)

### C. Sources of Probability Distortions

There are a number of possible sources of the estimated probability distortions depicted in Figure 2. In this section, we discuss what we learn from our estimated \(\Omega(\mu)\) about several potential sources.

One potential source of probability distortions is probability weighting, whereby probabilities are transformed into decision weights.\(^{29}\) Under a probability weighting model, and adopting the rank-dependent approach of Quiggin (1982), the utility of deductible lottery \(L_d\) is given by

\[
U(L_d) = (1 - \pi(\mu))u(w - p_d) + \pi(\mu)u(w - p_d - d),
\]

where \(\pi(\mu)\) is the probability weighting function. Clearly, equation (4) is equivalent to equation (1) with \(\Omega(\mu) = \pi(\mu)\). Insofar as \(\Omega(\mu)\) reflects probability weighting, our estimated \(\Omega(\mu)\) is striking in its resemblance to the probability weighting function originally posited by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In particular, it is consistent with a probability weighting function that exhibits overweighting of small probabilities, exhibits mild insensitivity to changes in probabilities, and trends toward a positive intercept as \(\mu\) approaches zero (though we have relatively little data for \(\mu < 0.01\)). By contrast, the probability weighting functions later suggested by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Lattimore, Baker, and Witte (1992), and Prelec (1998)—which are commonly used in the literature (e.g., Jullien and Salanié 2000; Kliger and Levy 2009; Bruhin, Fehr-Duda, and Epper 2010; Andrikogiannopoulou 2011)—will not fit our data well, because they trend toward a zero intercept and typically exhibit oversensitivity for probabilities less than 5 to 10 percent.\(^{30}\)

Another possible source of probability distortions is loss aversion. The original, “status quo” loss aversion proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979)—wherein gains and losses are defined relative to initial wealth—cannot explain aversion to risk in the context of insurance deductible choices because all outcomes are losses relative to initial wealth. More recently, however, Kőszegi and Rabin (2007) and Sydnor (2010) have suggested that a form of “rational expectations” loss aversion proposed by Kőszegei and Rabin (2006)—wherein gains and losses are defined relative to expectations about outcomes—can explain the aversion to risk manifested in insurance deductible choices. In the online Appendix, we describe the Kőszegei-Rabin (KR) model of loss aversion and derive its implications for deductible lotteries.\(^{31}\) Under the KR model, the utility of deductible lottery \(L_d\) is given by

\[\text{After all, with extreme noise, we would find match rates that are two to three times smaller, because the probability that a household’s "noisy" choice would equal any given deductible would be 20 percent in auto collision, 17 percent in auto comprehensive, and 25 percent in home.}\]

\[\text{As we discuss in Section VI, in our data literal probability weighting is indistinguishable from systematic risk misperceptions (i.e., incorrect subjective beliefs about claim probabilities).}\]

\[\text{For instance, if we impose on } \Omega(\mu) \text{ the one-parameter functional form proposed by Prelec (1998), we estimate Prelec’s } \alpha = 0.7. \text{ This estimate implies that } \Omega(\mu) > 1.0 \text{ for } \mu < 0.075 \text{ and } \Omega(\mu) > 1.5 \text{ for } \mu < 0.027.}\]

\[\text{Specifically, we apply the concept of “choice-acclimating personal equilibrium” (CPE), which KR suggest is appropriate for insurance choices because the insured commits to its policy choices well in advance of the resolution.}\]
The first bracketed term is merely the standard expected utility of $L_d$. The second bracketed term reflects the expected disutility due to loss aversion, where $\Lambda \geq 0$ captures the degree of loss aversion ($\Lambda = 0$ means no loss aversion). When $\Lambda > 0$, the outcome of experiencing a claim “looms larger” than the outcome of not experiencing a claim because the former is perceived as a loss relative to the latter. Equation (5) is equivalent to equation (1) with $\Omega(\mu) = \mu + \Lambda(1 - \mu)\mu$. If $\Lambda > 0$, then $\Omega(\mu) \neq \mu$. Thus, KR loss aversion can generate probability distortions. The probability distortions implied by KR loss aversion, however, are qualitatively different from the probability distortions we estimate—see panel A of Figure 3. In particular, the probability distortion function implied by KR loss aversion is too steep in the range of our data and trends toward a zero intercept. Hence, KR loss aversion alone cannot explain our data.

Probability distortions also can arise from disappointment aversion. In the online Appendix, we describe the model of disappointment aversion proposed by Gul (1991), in which disutility arises when the outcome of a lottery is less than the certainty equivalent of the lottery. Under Gul’s model, the utility of deductible lottery $L_d$ is given by

$$U(L_d) = \left(1 - \frac{\mu(1 + \beta)}{1 + \beta\mu}\right)u(w - p_d) + \left(\frac{\mu(1 + \beta)}{1 + \beta\mu}\right)u(w - p_d - d),$$

where $\beta \geq 0$ captures the degree of disappointment aversion ($\beta = 0$ means no disappointment aversion). When $\beta > 0$, the outcome of experiencing a claim is overweighted (relative to $\mu$) because of the disappointment associated therewith. Equation (6) is equivalent to equation (1) with $\Omega(\mu) = \mu(1 + \beta)/(1 + \beta\mu)$. If $\beta > 0$ then $\Omega(\mu) \neq \mu$. Thus, Gul disappointment aversion can generate probability distortions. Again, however, the probability distortions implied by Gul disappointment aversion are qualitatively different from the probability distortions we estimate—see panel B of Figure 3. As before, the implied probability distortion function is too steep and trends toward a zero intercept. Hence, Gul disappointment aversion alone cannot explain our data.

Because we can “reject” the hypotheses that KR loss aversion alone or Gul disappointment aversion alone can explain our estimated probability distortions, our analysis provides evidence that probability weighting (perhaps partly reflecting risk misperceptions) is playing a key role in the households’ deductible choices.
Finally, we consider a combination of sources. In the online Appendix, we derive that, if households have probability weighting \( \pi(\mu) \) and KR loss aversion \( \Lambda \), then the utility of deductible lottery \( L_d \) is given by

\[
U(L_d) = \left[ (1 - \pi(\mu))u(w - p_d) + \pi(\mu)u(w - p_d - d) \right] - \Lambda(1 - \pi(\mu)) \pi(\mu)[u(w - p_d) - u(w - p_d - d)],
\]

which is equivalent to equation (1) with \( \Omega(\mu) = \pi(\mu)[1 + \Lambda(1 - \pi(\mu))] \). From this equation, it is clear that, unless we impose strong functional form assumptions on \( \pi(\mu) \), we cannot separately identify \( \Lambda \) and \( \pi(\mu) \). Rather, the best we can do is to derive, for various values of \( \Lambda \), an implied probability weighting function \( \pi(\mu) \). Panel C of Figure 3 performs this exercise. It reinforces our conclusion that KR loss aversion
alone cannot explain our estimated probability distortions, because it is clear from the figure that no value of $\Lambda$ will generate an implied $\pi(\mu)$ that lies on the 45-degree line.33

IV. Analysis with Heterogeneous Preferences

In this section, we expand the model to permit heterogeneous preferences. With heterogeneous preferences, it is no longer feasible to take a semi-nonparametric approach to estimating the model, due to the curse of dimensionality and to the computational burden of our estimation procedure. Hence, we now take a parametric approach to $\Omega(\mu)$. Because Models 1a, 1b, and 1c yield nearly identical results, and because it naturally constrains $\Omega(\mu) > 0$, throughout this section we estimate a quadratic Chebyshev polynomial expansion of $\ln \Omega(\mu)$ (which is the best fit in Model 1a). As before, we estimate equation (3) assuming that utility is specified by equation (2) and that $\mu_{ij} = \frac{1}{2} \mu_{ij}$, and we use combined data for all three coverages. We assume that choice noise is independent of any observed or unobserved heterogeneity in preferences, and as before we permit the scale of choice noise to vary across coverages.

We take three approaches to modeling heterogeneity in preferences. In Model 2, we allow for observed heterogeneity in $r_i$ and $\Omega_i(\mu)$ by assuming

$$\ln r_i = \beta_r Z_i \quad \text{and} \quad \ln \Omega_i(\mu) = \beta_{\Omega,1} Z_i + (\beta_{\Omega,2} Z_i) \mu + (\beta_{\Omega,3} Z_i) \mu^2,$$

where $Z_i$ comprises a constant plus the variables in Table 1. We estimate Model 2 via maximum likelihood, and the parameter vector to be estimated is

$$\theta \equiv (\beta_r, \beta_{\Omega,1}, \beta_{\Omega,2}, \beta_{\Omega,3}, \sigma_L, \sigma_M, \sigma_H).$$

In Models 3 and 4, we allow for unobserved heterogeneity in $r_i$ and $\Omega_i(\mu)$. In particular, we assume

$$\ln r_i = \beta_r Z_i + \xi_{r,i} \quad \text{and} \quad \ln \Omega_i(\mu) = \beta_{\Omega,1} Z_i + (\beta_{\Omega,2} Z_i) \mu + (\beta_{\Omega,3} Z_i) \mu^2 + \xi_{\Omega,i},$$

where

$$\begin{pmatrix} \xi_{r,i} \\ \xi_{\Omega,i} \end{pmatrix} \sim \text{iid Normal} \left( \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}, \Phi \right),$$

with $\Phi \equiv \begin{bmatrix} \Phi_r & \Phi_{r,\Omega} \\ \Phi_{r,\Omega} & \Phi_{\Omega} \end{bmatrix}$. In Model 3, we allow for only unobserved heterogeneity, and thus $Z_i$ is a constant. In Model 4, we allow for both unobserved and observed heterogeneity, and $Z_i$ comprises a constant plus the variables in Table 1. We estimate Models 3 and 4 via Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC), and the parameters to be estimated are $\theta$ and $\Phi$.34

33 While we focus on a combination of probability weighting and KR loss aversion, a similar analysis of a combination of probability weighting and Gul disappointment aversion yields analogous conclusions.

34 The resulting econometric model is a mixed multinomial logit (McFadden and Train 2000). Within the literature on estimating risk preferences, a similar specification is employed by Andrikogiannopoulou (2011).
regarding the MCMC estimation procedure are set forth in the online Appendix\textsuperscript{35}. After each estimation, we use the estimates to assign fitted values of \( r_i \) and \( \Omega_i(\mu) \) to each household \( i \).\textsuperscript{36}

Table 7 summarizes the estimates for Models 2, 3, and 4.\textsuperscript{37} For comparison, it also restates the estimates from Model 1a. Figure 4 depicts the mean fitted value of \( \Omega(\mu) \) for each model. For comparison, it also depicts the estimated \( \Omega(\mu) \) in Models 1a and 1c, along with the 95 percent confidence bands for Model 1c.

The mean estimated probability distortions in Models 2, 3, and 4 are nearly identical to each other and to the estimated probability distortions in Model 1. Hence, whether we assume preferences are homogeneous or allow for observed or unobserved heterogeneity, the main message is the same: large probability distortions characterized by substantial overweighting of claim probabilities and only mild insensitivity to probability changes.

By contrast, the estimated degree of standard risk aversion is somewhat sensitive to the modeling approach. In Model 2, the mean fitted value of \( r \) is 0.00073, slightly higher than in Model 1a. In Models 3 and 4, the estimates for \( r \) are higher still—the mean fitted values are 0.00156 and 0.00147, respectively.

The estimates for the scale of choice noise are similarly sensitive. Whereas the estimates for Model 2 differ only slightly from those in Model 1a, the estimates for Models 3 and 4 (though similar to each other) differ sizably from those in Model 1a—roughly speaking, \( \hat{\sigma}_L \) and \( \hat{\sigma}_M \) are 40 percent lower and \( \hat{\sigma}_H \) is 40 percent higher. That said, the estimates for each model display the same qualitative pattern: \( \hat{\sigma}_M < \hat{\sigma}_L << \hat{\sigma}_H \).

Lastly, we make two observations about the estimated variance-covariance matrix of unobserved heterogeneity. First, the variance estimates imply that there indeed is unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. Consider, for instance, Model 3 (the message is the same for Model 4, although the calculations are more involved because

\textsuperscript{35} The procedure closely follows Train (2009, chapter 12). The estimation was performed in MATLAB using a modified version of Train’s software, “Mixed logit estimation by Bayesian methods.” Convergence diagnostic tests were run using the CODA package adapted for MATLAB by James P. LeSage.

\textsuperscript{36} In the case of Models 3 and 4, the fitted values are calculated taking into account the estimates for \( \Phi \). Specifically, \( \hat{r}_i = \exp(\hat{\beta}_i Z_i + (\hat{\Phi}_r/2)) \) and \( \Omega_i(\mu) = \exp(\hat{\beta}_{121} Z_{i1} + (\hat{\beta}_{122} Z_{i2}) \mu + (\hat{\beta}_{123} Z_{i3}) \mu^2 + (\hat{\Phi}_{12}/2)) \).

\textsuperscript{37} The complete estimates are reported in Tables A.6, A.7, and A.8 in the online Appendix.
of the presence of observed heterogeneity). For standard risk aversion, the estimate of $\Phi_r = 0.55$ implies that the 2.5th, 25th, 75th, and 97.5th percentiles are 0.00028, 0.00072, 0.00195, and 0.00507, respectively. For probability distortions, the estimate of $\Phi_\Omega = 0.37$ implies that the 2.5th, 25th, 75th, and 97.5th pointwise percentiles are 0.25 $\bar{\Omega}(\mu)$, 0.55 $\bar{\Omega}(\mu)$, 1.25 $\bar{\Omega}(\mu)$, and 2.73 $\bar{\Omega}(\mu)$, where $\bar{\Omega}(\mu)$ is the mean fitted probability distortion depicted in Figure 4. This substantial unobserved heterogeneity is consistent with similar findings on standard risk aversion by Cohen and Einav (2007) and on cumulative prospect theory parameters by Andrikogiannopoulou (2011).38 We note, however, that we find less unobserved heterogeneity in standard risk aversion than do Cohen and Einav (2007).39 Despite this unobserved heterogeneity, our main message persists: the data are best explained by large probability distortions among the majority of households. Furthermore, our conclusions regarding the sources of probability distortions—and in particular that neither KR loss aversion alone nor Gul disappointment aversion alone can explain our estimated probability distortions—also persist.

Our second observation is that the covariance estimate implies a negative correlation between unobserved heterogeneity in $r$ and $\Omega(\mu)$: $-0.49$ in both Models 3

---

38 It also is consistent with findings by Chiappori et al. (2012) and Gandhi and Serrano-Padial (2012), who use market-level gambling data to study, respectively, heterogeneity in preferences and heterogeneity in beliefs (which, incidentally, feature nonvanishing chances being assigned to events with vanishing probabilities).

39 This is perhaps not surprising given that we have a second dimension of unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. Because Andrikogiannopoulou (2011) estimates a very different model—which in particular assumes no standard risk aversion and imposes a functional form for probability weighting that reflects a very different shape from ours—it is difficult to compare the magnitude of our estimates of unobserved heterogeneity with those in her paper.
This suggests that the unexplained variation in the households’ deductible choices (after controlling for premiums, claim probabilities, and observed heterogeneity) is best explained not by heterogeneity in their “overall” aversion to risk but rather by heterogeneity in their combinations of standard risk aversion and probability distortions. After all, if such unexplained variation in deductible choices were best explained by heterogeneity in overall aversion to risk, we would expect a positive correlation because moving $r$ and $\Omega(\mu)$ in the same direction is the most “efficient” way of varying overall aversion to risk. However, if there were little heterogeneity in overall aversion to risk, moving $r$ and $\Omega(\mu)$ in opposite directions would be necessary to explain such variation in deductible choices.

V. Sensitivity Analysis

Our main analysis yields a clear main message: large probability distortions characterized by substantial overweighting and mild insensitivity. Moreover, our main analysis suggests that this message is robust to different approaches to modeling heterogeneity in preferences. In this section, we further investigate the sensitivity of this message, and we find that it is robust to various other modeling assumptions. By contrast, we generally find that the estimates for standard risk aversion are more sensitive. To conserve space, we only summarize the results of the sensitivity analysis below. The complete results are available in the online Appendix (Tables A.9 through A.22). In most of the sensitivity analysis, we restrict attention to Models 2 and 3. (Recall that Model 2 allows for observed heterogeneity in preferences and Model 3 allows for unobserved heterogeneity in preferences.) We do not reestimate Model 4 because of the extreme computational burden of estimating the model with both observed and unobserved heterogeneity, and also because Models 2, 3, and 4 (not to mention Model 1) all yield the same main message.

A. Unobserved Heterogeneity in Risk

In our main analysis, we assume that the households’ subjective claim probabilities correspond to our predicted claim probabilities, which reflect only observed heterogeneity. The results of our claim rate regressions, however, imply that there is unobserved heterogeneity. In this section, we take two approaches to accounting for this unobserved heterogeneity.

In our first approach, we assume that unobserved heterogeneity in risk is not correlated with unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. With this assumption, we use the results of the claim rate regressions to assign to each household a predicted distribution of claim probabilities, $\hat{F}(\mu)$, and then integrate over $\hat{F}(\mu)$ to construct the likelihood function. Column (a) of Table 8 summarizes the estimates for Models 2 and 3 when we allow for unobserved heterogeneity in risk in this way.

---

40 To be clear, Table 7 reports that the implied correlation between $\xi_r, i$ and $\xi_\Omega, i$ is $-0.72$. Given the log-linear specifications for $r_i$ and $\Omega_i(\mu)$, this implies that the correlation between $r_i$ and $\Omega_i(\mu)$ due to unobserved heterogeneity is $-0.49$.

41 Estimating Model 4 takes approximately one week (on a Dell Precision 7500 with dual XEON 5680 processors with 24GB of memory). In comparison, estimating Model 3 takes approximately one day, and estimating Model 2 takes less than an hour.
For comparison, the table also restates the benchmark estimates. Our main message remains unchanged. The estimates for $\Omega(\mu)$ indicate similarly large probability distortions—see Figure A.1 in the online Appendix. The estimates for $r$ indicate levels of standard risk aversion that are somewhat higher than the benchmark estimates. Lastly, we note that the estimates for the scale of choice noise, as well as the estimates for $\phi$, are similar to the benchmark estimates.

In our second approach, we allow for correlation between unobserved heterogeneity in risk and unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. In principle, we could estimate Model 3 with the addition of unobserved heterogeneity in claim probabilities and permit a flexible correlation structure among the various sources of unobserved heterogeneity. Doing so, however, would impose an undue computational burden and put a strain on identification. Instead, we estimate the following model:

$$\ln r_i = r + \xi_{r,i} \quad \text{and} \quad \Omega_{ij}(\mu) = a + b\mu_{ij}\exp(\xi_{b,ij}),$$

where $(\xi_{r,i}, \xi_{b,il}, \xi_{b,im}, \xi_{b,ih}) \sim \text{Normal}(0, \Psi)$ and the parameters to be estimated are $r$, $a$, $b$, and $\Psi$. Relative to Model 3, this model imposes a more restrictive functional form on $\Omega(\mu)$ and also alters the way in which unobserved heterogeneity enters into $\Omega(\mu)$. However, it has several compensating virtues. Perhaps most important, given the way $\xi_b$ enters the model, it can be interpreted as unobserved heterogeneity in probability distortions (as in our first approach), but it also can be interpreted as unobserved heterogeneity in subjective risk perceptions (i.e., subjective claim probabilities). Thus, the model nests—when $a = 0$ and $b = 1$—a standard expected utility model with no probability distortions but with unobserved heterogeneity in both

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benchmark estimates</th>
<th>Unobserved heterogeneity in risk</th>
<th>Restricted choice noise</th>
<th>CRRA utility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard risk aversion</td>
<td>0.00073</td>
<td>0.00156</td>
<td>0.00097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln \Omega(\mu):$ constant</td>
<td>$-2.73$</td>
<td>$-2.82$</td>
<td>$-2.73$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln \Omega(\mu):$ linear</td>
<td>12.40</td>
<td>10.72</td>
<td>11.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln \Omega(\mu):$ quadratic</td>
<td>$-35.61$</td>
<td>$-28.04$</td>
<td>$-21.78$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_\xi$</td>
<td>27.22</td>
<td>17.14</td>
<td>25.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_\mu$</td>
<td>17.91</td>
<td>10.16</td>
<td>18.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_\Omega$</td>
<td>65.45</td>
<td>95.69</td>
<td>66.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Phi_r$</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Phi_\mu$</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Phi_{r,\Omega}$</td>
<td>$-0.33$</td>
<td>$-0.28$</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied corr$(\xi_{r,i}, \xi_{b,ij})$</td>
<td>$-0.72$</td>
<td>$-0.72$</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The estimates reported for standard risk aversion are the mean fitted coefficients of absolute risk aversion ($r$), except in the case of CRRA utility, in which case they are the mean fitted coefficients of relative risk aversion ($\rho$). In the case of restricted choice noise, $\sigma_\xi$, $\sigma_\mu$, and $\sigma_\Omega$ are by construction. Core sample of 4,170 households.
risk and standard risk aversion (and a flexible correlation structure). In addition, it allows for coverage-specific unobserved heterogeneity, and it is simple and computationally tractable.

Table A.11 in the online Appendix reports our MCMC estimates for this model. For $\Omega(\mu)$, we obtain an intercept of $\hat{a} = 0.041$ (standard error: 0.002) and a slope of $\hat{b} = 0.864$ (standard error: 0.029). These estimates clearly reject a standard expected utility model and yield probability distortions that are quite similar to Model 3. Hence, our main message remains unchanged. The estimates for standard risk aversion and for the scale of choice noise are also similar to Model 3. The estimates for the variance-covariance matrix $\Psi$ imply much higher variances of unobserved heterogeneity in risk than do the estimates for $\phi$ from the claim rate regressions, suggesting either that there is substantial unobserved heterogeneity in probability distortions or that there indeed is unobserved heterogeneity in subjective risk perceptions beyond the unobserved heterogeneity in objective risk. Interestingly, the variance estimates are quite similar for auto collision and home, but substantially higher for auto comprehensive, perhaps suggesting that households have more accurate beliefs about risk in domains in which adverse events occur more frequently. Lastly, the cross-coverage correlations of unobserved heterogeneity in risk are all high, supporting our benchmark modeling assumption that there is a household-specific component in probability distortions that is common across coverages.

Finally, we note that unobserved heterogeneity in risk creates an adverse selection problem for the insurance company. However, adverse selection from the company’s perspective is irrelevant to our analysis. What matters here is to account for selection based on unobservable risk, which is precisely what we do.

B. Restricted Choice Noise

In the model, we use choice noise to account for observationally equivalent households choosing different deductibles, and for individual households making “inconsistent” choices across coverages. In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of our main message to this modeling choice by restricting the scale of choice noise. Column (b) of Table 8 summarizes the estimates for Models 2 and 3 when we restrict the scale of choice noise to half its estimated magnitude (i.e., we fix $\sigma_j \equiv \hat{\sigma}_j / 2$). Our main message is unchanged. Indeed, the estimated probability distortions become even more pronounced—see Figure A.2 in the online Appendix. At the same time, the estimate for standard risk aversion becomes extremely small.

C. CRRA Utility

In our analysis, we use a second-order Taylor expansion of the utility function. As a check of this approach, we consider CRRA utility, $u(w) = w^{1-\rho}/(1 - \rho)$, where $\rho > 0$ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The CRRA family is “the most

\[ \text{Technically, this nesting is complete only if we further impose that } (\xi_{r,i}, \xi_{b,L}, \xi_{b,M}, \xi_{b,H}) \overset{iid}{\sim} \text{Normal}(\Upsilon, \Psi), \text{ where } \Upsilon_j = -\Psi_{jj}/2. \text{ If we impose this restriction, the results are very similar to those we report (which assume } \Upsilon = 0). \]

\[ \text{The somewhat lower intercept is compensated by the higher variance of the unobserved heterogeneity terms, } \Psi_b, \text{ which imply a higher } E(\exp(\xi_b)). \]
widely used parametric family for fitting utility functions to data” (Wakker 2008). With CRRA utility, equation (1) becomes

\[ U(L_d) = (1 - \Omega(\mu))(w - p_d)^{1-\rho} + \Omega(\mu)(w - p_d - d)^{1-\rho}. \]

A disadvantage of CRRA utility is that it requires wealth as an input, and moreover there surely is heterogeneity in wealth across the households in our core sample. To account for these issues, we assume that (i) wealth is proportional to home value and (ii) average wealth is $33,000 (approximately equal to 2010 US per capita disposable personal income). The average home value in the core sample is approximately $191,000. Thus, we assume \( w = \left(\frac{33}{191}\right)(\text{home value})^{0.44}. \)

We reestimate Models 2 and 3. For Model 2, we assume \( \ln \rho_i = \beta_{\rho} Z_i \), where \( Z_i \) comprises a constant plus the variables in Table 1. For Model 3, we assume \( \ln \rho_i = \beta_{\rho} + \xi_{\rho, i} \). We otherwise proceed exactly as described in Section IV. Column (c) of Table 8 summarizes the estimates, and Figure A.3 in the online Appendix depicts the mean estimated \( \Omega(\mu) \) for each model. The main message is much the same: we find large probability distortions characterized by substantial overweighting and mild insensitivity. In fact, the probability distortions become somewhat more pronounced. At the same time, the estimates for standard risk aversion become very small. The mean fitted values of \( \rho \) are 0.37 and 0.21 in Models 2 and 3, respectively. Evaluated at average wealth of $33,000, these estimates imply a coefficient of absolute risk aversion on the order of \( r = 0.00001. \)

D. Moral Hazard

Throughout our analysis, we assume that deductible choice does not influence claim risk. That is, we assume there is no deductible-related moral hazard. In this section, we assess this assumption.

There are two types of moral hazard that might operate in our setting. First, a household’s deductible choice might influence its incentives to take care (ex ante moral hazard). Second, a household’s deductible choice might influence its incentives to file a claim after experiencing a loss (ex post moral hazard), especially if its premium is experience rated or if the loss results in a “nil” claim (i.e., a claim that does not exceed its deductible). For either type of moral hazard, the incentive to alter behavior—i.e., take more care or file fewer claims—is stronger for households with larger deductibles. Hence, we investigate whether moral hazard is a significant issue in our data by examining whether our predicted claim probabilities change if we exclude households with high deductibles.

Specifically, we rerun our claim rate regressions using a restricted sample of the full dataset in which we drop all household-coverage-year records with deductibles

\[ \text{We also restrict households to have positive wealth. The results presented here restrict } w \geq 12,000 \text{ (i.e., if a household’s implied } w \text{ is less than } 12,000, \text{ we assign it a wealth of } 12,000). \text{ We investigated sensitivity to this cutoff, and it matters very little (because very few households are affected).} \]

\[ \text{To enable a global search over } \rho, \text{ we scale the model by } (33,000)^{0.5}. \text{ Locally, the results are indistinguishable from those obtained without rescaling.} \]
We then use the new estimates to generate revised predicted claim probabilities for all households in the core sample (including those with deductibles of $1,000 or larger). Comparing the revised predicted claim rates with the benchmark predicted claim rates, we find that they are essentially indistinguishable—in each coverage, pairwise correlations exceed 0.995, and linear regressions yield intercepts less than 0.001 and coefficients of determination ($R^2$) greater than 0.99. Moreover, the estimates of the variance of unobserved heterogeneity in claim rates are nearly identical.\textsuperscript{47} Not surprisingly, if we reestimate our baseline model using the revised predicted claim probabilities, the results are virtually identical.\textsuperscript{48}

The foregoing analysis suggests that moral hazard is not a significant issue in our data. This is perhaps not surprising, for two reasons. First, the empirical evidence on moral hazard in auto insurance markets is mixed. (We are not aware of any empirical evidence on moral hazard in home insurance markets.) Most studies that use “positive correlation” tests of asymmetric information in auto insurance do not find evidence of a correlation between coverage and risk (e.g., Chiappori and Salanié 2000; for a recent review of the literature, see Cohen and Siegelman 2010).\textsuperscript{48} Second, there are theoretical reasons to discount the force of moral hazard in our setting. In particular, because deductibles are small relative to the overall level of coverage, ex ante moral hazard strikes us as implausible in our setting.\textsuperscript{49} As for ex post moral hazard, households have countervailing incentives to file claims no matter the size of the loss—under the terms of the company’s policies, if a household fails to report a claimable event (especially an event that is a matter of public record—e.g., collision events typically entail police reports), it risks denial of all forms of coverage (notably liability coverage) for such event and also cancellation (or nonrenewal) of its policy.

Finally, we note that, even if our predicted claim rates are roughly correct, the possibility of nil claims could bias our results, as they violate our assumption that every claim exceeds the highest available deductible (which underlies how we define the deductible lotteries). To investigate this potential, we reestimate Model 1a under the extreme counterfactual assumption that claimable events invariably result in losses between $500 and $1,000, specifically $750. With this assumption, our model is unchanged except that the lottery associated with a $1,000 deductible becomes $L_{1000} = (-p_{1000}, 1 - \mu; -p_{1000} - 750, \mu)$. Because this change makes the $1,000 deductible more attractive, we will need more overall aversion to risk to explain households choosing smaller deductibles—i.e., $r$ or $\Omega(\mu)$ will need to increase. It turns out that the estimates for $\Omega(\mu)$ indicate very similar probability distortions—

\textsuperscript{46} We draw the line at the $1,000 deductible and not the $500 deductible because realistically it is difficult to imagine claimable events that result in losses smaller than $500.

\textsuperscript{47} The revised estimates are 0.22, 0.56, and 0.44 in auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home, respectively, whereas the corresponding benchmark estimates are 0.22, 0.57, and 0.45.

\textsuperscript{48} Beginning with Abbring et al. (2003) and Abbring, Chiappori, and Pinquet (2003), a second strand of literature tests for moral hazard in longitudinal auto insurance data using various dynamic approaches. Abbring, Chiappori, and Pinquet (2003) find no evidence of moral hazard in French data. A handful of subsequent studies present some evidence of moral hazard using data from Canada and Europe. The only study of which we are aware that uses US data is Israel (2004), which reports a small moral hazard effect for drivers in Illinois. Each of these studies, however, identifies a moral hazard effect with respect to either liability coverage or a composite coverage that confounds liability coverage with other coverages. None of them identifies a separate moral hazard attributable to the choice of deductible in the auto coverages we study.

\textsuperscript{49} We note that Cohen and Einav (2007) reach the same conclusion. Furthermore, we note that the principal justification for deductibles is the insurer’s administrative costs (Arrow 1963).
see Figure A.4 in the online Appendix. What changes is the estimate for standard risk aversion: \( \hat{r} \) increases to 0.002. This suggests that our main message is robust to the possibility of nil claims.

E. Additional Sensitivity Checks

In the online Appendix, we report the results of several additional sensitivity checks, in which we consider: constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility; alternative samples of the data; restricted menus of deductible options; and alternative assumptions about the structure of choice noise. In each case, the estimates indicate probability distortions that are similar to the benchmark, further reinforcing our main message.

VI. Discussion

We develop a structural model of risky choice that permits standard risk aversion and nonstandard probability distortions, and we estimate the model using data on households’ deductible choices in auto and home insurance. We find that large probability distortions—characterized by substantial overweighting of small probabilities and only mild insensitivity to probability changes—play a statistically and economically significant role in explaining households’ deductible choices. Our results yield important insights about the possible sources of these probability distortions. In particular, our analysis offers evidence of probability weighting and suggests a probability weighting function that closely resembles the form originally suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In addition, we can “reject” the hypothesis that KR loss aversion alone or Gul disappointment aversion alone can explain our estimated probability distortions, though we cannot say whether they might be playing a role in conjunction with probability weighting.

Perhaps the main takeaway of the article is that economists should pay greater attention to the question of how people evaluate risk. Prospect theory incorporates two key features: a value function that describes how people evaluate outcomes and a probability weighting function that describes how people evaluate risk. The behavioral literature, however, has focused primarily on the value function, and there has been relatively little focus on probability weighting.\(^{50}\) In light of our work, as well as other recent work that reaches similar conclusions using different data and methods, it seems clear that future research on decision making under uncertainty should focus more attention on probability weighting.\(^{51}\)

Another takeaway relates to Rabin’s (2000) critique of expected utility theory. Rabin demonstrates that reliance on the expected utility model to explain aversion to moderate-stakes risk is problematic, because the “estimated” model would imply an implausible degree of risk aversion over large-stakes risk.\(^{52}\) Indeed, when we estimate

\(^{50}\) Two prominent review papers—an early paper that helped set the agenda for behavioral economics (Rabin 1998) and a recent paper that surveys the current state of empirical behavioral economics (DellaVigna 2009)—contain almost no discussion of probability weighting. The behavioral finance literature has paid more attention to probability weighting (see, e.g., Barberis and Huang 2008; Barberis 2012).

\(^{51}\) Indeed, Prelec (2000) conjectured that “probability nonlinearity will eventually be recognized as a more important determinant of risk attitudes than money nonlinearity.”

\(^{52}\) More narrowly, Drèze (1981) and Sydnor (2010) describe how real-world insurance deductibles seem to imply “too much” risk aversion.
an expected utility model—which does not permit probability distortions—our estimate of standard risk aversion is “too large” in the Rabin sense. However, when we estimate our model—which permits probability distortions—there is far less standard risk aversion. This suggests that it may be possible—contrary to what some have argued—to resolve Rabin’s anomaly without moving to models that impose zero standard risk aversion and use a nonstandard value function to explain aversion to risk.

That said, it is worth highlighting certain limitations of our analysis. An important limitation is that, while our analysis clearly indicates that a lot of “action” lies in how people evaluate risk, it does not enable us to say whether households are engaging in probability weighting per se or whether their subjective beliefs about risk simply do not correspond to the objective probabilities.\(^{53}\) In some ways, this distinction is not important, because it is irrelevant for predicting simple risky choices like those we study in this article. But in other ways, this distinction is quite relevant. Notably, the arguments in favor of policy interventions to educate households about the risks they face have more purchase if our estimated probability distortions reflect risk misperceptions. They have less purchase, and perhaps none, if our estimated probability distortions reflect probability weighting.

Another important limitation is that our analysis relies exclusively on insurance deductible choices, and, hence, we urge caution when generalizing our conclusions to other domains. In particular, the vast majority of the claim probabilities we observe lie between 0 and 16 percent, and thus our analysis implies little about what probability distortions might look like outside that range. While we suspect that our main message would resonate in many domains beyond insurance deductible choices that involve similar probabilities, we hesitate to make any conjectures about settings where larger probabilities are involved.

Finally, we highlight a natural question that arises from our analysis: are firms aware of the nature of households’ risk preferences, and do they react optimally to these risk preferences? Investigating this question would require significant further thought. Even if we thought that the insurance company were a risk neutral expected profit maximizer, it would be too simplistic to assume that it merely maximizes the (negative) expected value of the deductible lottery chosen by households in our setting. Optimal insurance contracts also depend on the legal restrictions imposed by regulators, the nature of competition with other insurance companies, and the nature of an insurance company’s costs (for underwriting policies, servicing claims, etc.). Moreover, insurance companies care also about dynamic demand, which is something we have not considered in this article. Hence, we view this question as beyond the scope of the present article, but an important question for future research.

\(^{53}\) Relatedly, although probability weighting is a natural candidate for explaining the probability distortions that we find, other mechanisms, such as ambiguity aversion, also could give rise to similar probability distortions. In fact, Fellner (1961) suggests using “distorted probabilities” to model the aversion to ambiguity in the Ellsberg (1961) paradox.
REFERENCES


This article has been cited by: